The literature on regionalist parties has traditionally focused on the origins of their electoral strength while their ideology remains an under-explored aspect of territorial party politics. This is surprising because for the question of whether decentralization 'accommodates' or 'empowers' regionalist pressure one needs to consider both. In this paper we single out the factors that increase the probability of adopting a radical (secessionist) as opposed to a moderate (autonomist) ideological stance, with a particular focus on the effect of decentralization. We make use of a large and original dataset, covering 11 countries, 49 regions, and 78 parties for the 1940s-2000s. Beyond the level of decentralization and decentralization reforms, we analyze the impact of two sets of factors: the first concerns regional identity and includes regional language, regional history and geographical remoteness; while the second concerns institutional/political variables which include voting systems, competition from statewide parties and from other regionalist parties, and office responsibility. We find that all variables matter for regionalist party ideology but with different effects across regional and national electoral arenas. We also find that level of decentralization and regional reform is significantly associated with radicalism, which suggests that policy success and accommodative strategies by statewide parties may lead to a polarization on the centre-periphery dimension.
Introduction
Regionalist parties have been stable and important actors in many Western democracies. To mention some of the most evident and recent examples: in Belgium the New Flemish Alliance (NVA) has become the biggest party in the country; in Italy the Northern League, or Lega Nord (LN), has held office in Rome over most of the last decade and has gained control of the three major northern regions; in the UK the Scottish National Party (SNP) has been governing Scotland since 2007; and in Spain several regions are governed by regionalist parties, with at least two -Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Basque National Party (PNV) -having often had a crucial role in supporting minority governments in the national parliament. The study of these political actors, therefore, remains very important in order to understand some of the dynamics of contemporary party politics.
The level of the challenge they pose to the state can, however, vary substantively, depending not only on their electoral strength but also on their ideological radicalism.
While many of these parties have advocated some kind of regional autonomy, in some cases they have put forward demands for secession. In particular, initiatives for partitioning the state have considerably increased in number and intensity. In 1980, and 1995, independence referendums were held in Quebec, under pressure from the Parti Quebecois (PQ) and the Bloc Quebecois (BQ), with the secessionist camp coming very close to winning at the second attempt (Pammett and Le Duc, 2001) . In 2002, the Basque regional government, constituted by the PNV and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), announced a new plan to de facto partition the Basque country region from the Spanish state.
1 In 2011, the SNP won the Scottish regional election with a pledge to hold an independence referendum, which it had been unable to stage in its first term in office. The referendum is scheduled for autumn 2014 and will represent the strongest threat to state integrity in Western Europe since the end of WW2.
2 Similarly, although the actualization of the project is much more uncertain, CiU and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) have envisaged holding an independence referendum in Catalonia in 2014 (Financial Times, 19 December 2012) . In short, while Dion's (1996) historical law -'Secessionists never managed to split a well-established democracy through a referendum or an electoral victory' -still holds, it is definitely being shaken.
In all the cases mentioned above the threat posed to the integrity of the state is not only due to regionalist parties' 'threatening capacity' (i.e. their electoral strength) but, in the first place, to their 'threatening intention' (i.e. their secessionist ideological stance). Therefore, it is crucial to understand why and under which circumstances regionalist parties develop moderate or radical ideologies in regard to self-government claims.
Yet, most scholarship has so far focused either on the determinants of regionalist parties' electoral success (Gourevitch; 1979; De Winter, 1998; Gordin, 2001; Sorens, 2005; Tronconi, 2006; Meguid, 2008) or (somewhat less so) on the party politics of territorial reforms, from the perspective of both regionalist and statewide parties (Alonso, 2012; Massetti and Toubeau, 2013) . Comparative works analyzing regionalist parties' ideology per se, as a dependent variable, have remained rare exceptions (Newman, 1997; Van Houten, 2000; Massetti, 2009) . 3 It is not by chance that one of the most authoritative works on regionalist parties concludes by stating that 'ideology stands out as one of the most important aspects to cover in future comparative research' (Gomez-Reino et al, 2006: 252) .
We aim to address this lacuna in the literature and, by focusing on the self-government dimension of regionalist parties ' ideology, 4 to tackle a question which bears strong implications for the challenge brought against state integrity. In particular, beyond assessing the impact of structural and, often, time-invariant factors, such as the cultural distinctiveness of the region vis à vis the state, we want to investigate the effect of the unfolding process of decentralization. In so doing, we aim to contribute, in an original way, to the ongoing debate on decentralization and regionalist parties, which sees the 'the accommodation thesis' -decentralization reforms appease regionalist parties' claims and undermine their electoral strength -competing against the 'empowerment thesis' -decentralization creates/ strengthens the regional institutions in which regionalist parties thrive, galvanizes their electorates and results in overall electoral growth. Several comparative works have recently engaged with this debate by siding, more or less neatly, with one thesis or the other (Brancati, 2008; Lublin; Meguid, 2013a Meguid, , 2013b Massetti and Schakel, 2013) . Although we are interested in analyzing the effect of decentralization on regionalist parties' ideological stance, rather than their electoral strength, our work does speak to this strand of the literature insofar as ideological adaptation is linked to electoral strategies. In particular, our findings show that decentralization indirectly fuels secessionism (Brancati, 2006) , and that decentralization has a differentiated effect on regionalist parties depending on the electoral venue -regional or national (Meguid, 2013b; Massetti and Schakel, 2013) .
In 'Theory and hypotheses', we review the extant literature in order to develop a comprehensive theoretical and analytical framework, and a set of expectations on the individual independent variables. Then, in 'Regionalist parties dataset', we define and categorize regionalist parties according to their ideology. The section 'Variables and method' introduces the independent variables and the methodology. 'Results' presents and discusses the results. The main findings are then summarized in the concluding section, 'Discussion'.
Theory and hypotheses
Regionalist ideology revolves around the idea that the region is a separate 'body politic' vis à vis the rest of the state to which it belongs (Fitjar, 2010) . The immediate and inevitable corollary, which defines the regionalist party family from an ideological/programmatic perspective, is that the region deserves some kind of territorially based self-government (De Winter, 1998: 204; Massetti, 2009: 503; Alonso, 2012: 1) . Since we can observe a lot of variance in the level of self-government claimed by regionalist parties (Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; Newman, 1997; De Winter, 1998; Massetti, 2009; Alonso, 2012) , we want to explain the different radicalism of claims across cases, across time, and distinguishing between the regional and national level of government. The inclusion of both levels is paramount as they are equally important for regionalist parties, which in most cases try to pursue their selfgovernment objectives using both venues (Gomez-Reino et al, 2006; Elias and Tronconi, 2011a) . In addition, the sets of parties competing in regional and national elections are not exactly the same, since some parties only compete at one level. For instance, following the general Canadian pattern, Quebecois regionalist parties only compete at one level of government.
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In approaching our research question we refer to different theories and strands of the literature which emphasize different explanatory factors. However, we are primarily interested in exploring the impact of decentralization, both in terms of level of regional authority and in terms of reform (i.e. changes in the level of regional authority). This analytical angle not only refers to an 'institutionalist' theoretical perspective but also to a 'party competition' perspective. Indeed, scholars subscribing to the 'accommodation thesis' have highlighted the strategic nature of decentralization reforms implemented by statewide parties as a means aimed at, among other things, 6 weakening the electoral challenge posed by regionalist parties (Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; De Winter, 1998) . The logic is straightforward: once the most characterizing demands of regionalist parties are accommodated, they will lose their raison d'être and their voters will gradually abandon them. The Flemish Volksunie (VU) represents a paradigmatic case of a regionalist party which paid for its policy success -the progressive federalization of Belgium -with electoral decline and, eventually, disappearance (De Winter, 2006) .
However, several important caveats have been added to the basic tenets of the accommodation thesis. First, this strategy appears to work only at national level, while at regional level it might lead to the opposite outcome -i.e. to an electoral growth of regionalist parties (Meguid, 2013a; 2013b) . This is possibly due to the fact that, at regional level, the mission of regionalist parties does not only consist of being the advocates for self-government demands but also the potential administrators of (already achieved) regional powers in the exclusive interest of the regional population (Gomez-Reino et al, 2006: 258) . For instance, Elias and Tronconi (2011b: 368) observe that the Sudtiroler Volkspartei (SVP)'s demands for self-government within Italy had been largely satisfied in the 1990s. Since then, the SVP has turned its attentions to the challenges of governing the regional territory with a focus on the kind of day-to-day policy issues that are typical of left-right party competition in any territory.
Second and crucially for our research question, at national level the accommodation strategy undermines autonomist regionalist parties more than secessionist ones (Massetti and Schakel, 2013) . Taking Flanders again as an illuminating example, we can observe that the decline and disappearance of the relatively moderate VU has been paralleled by the birth and electoral rise of more radical partiesVlaams Blok/Belang (VB) and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) - (De Winter 2011; Deschouwer, 2013) . This dynamic is perfectly in line with the logic of the accommodation thesis: as statewide parties are able to accommodate only some regionalist demands (definitely not the secessionist ones), the raison d'être of secessionist parties is more likely to persist. Indeed, from the point of view of regionalist parties (at least those that participate in national elections), decentralization reforms can represent an incentive/constraint to strategically radicalize their self-government claims (Elias and Tronconi, 2011a: 21; Alonso, 2012) .
To sum up, adopting an institutionalist/rational choice perspective we formulate the following hypotheses concerning decentralization level and decentralization reform. First, we expect the probability of finding more radical regionalist parties to be higher in strongly decentralized contexts than in weakly decentralized ones. For instance, in federal systems (such as Switzerland, Canada or Germany) there is no reason for regionalist parties to make mild demands, as regions already enjoy a strong degree of self-government; whereas in strongly centralized contexts (such as pre-1980 France), the mere recognition and establishment of a regional level of government could have represented a meaningful and salient demand. Second, we expect the probability of finding more radical regionalist parties to increase as decentralization reforms unfold. For instance, as the statutes of Spanish regions have been reformed in a pro-decentralization direction in the last 35 years, it is logical to expect that many Spanish regionalist parties will have adopted, by the late 2000s, more radical ideological stances compared with those of the early 1980s.
Having outlined the theoretical and empirical considerations underpinning our expectations on decentralization, we now present other sets of factors that, arguably, affect regionalist parties' positioning on self-government claims. First, drawing on the historical-sociological approach (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) , we identify three factors linked to the distinctiveness (vis à vis the rest of the state) of 'regional identity': the presence of a regional language; the presence of a distinct institutional history of the region (e.g. having been an independent state in the past; relatively recent annexation in the current state, etc.); geographical isolation, especially in the form of island regions (Baldacchino and Hepburn, 2012) . The idea behind the selection of these factors is that there could be a link between, on the one hand, the extent to which the regional identity is distinct from national identity and, on the other hand, the extent to which the region is perceived as a separate body politic and, therefore, the level of radicalism of selfgovernment claims.
The second set of factors concerns party competition. Following a rational choice (Downs, 1957) and an institutionalist/rational choice approach (Cox, 1999) , we consider all institutional and political variables that, shaping the dynamics of party competition, may have an impact on regionalist parties' level of radicalism. Starting with electoral systems, we follow Newman's (1997) observation that regionalist parties emerging (as third party) under majoritarian systems (e.g. in Canada and in the UK) tend to remain united and to adopt a radical position on the centre-periphery dimension in order to properly distinguish themselves from the statewide competitors. In contrast, proportional systems can allow for the emergence and persistence of more than one regionalist party in the same region, with different ideological orientations in several dimensions, including self-government. Therefore, we expect a higher probability of observing radical parties in majoritarian systems than in mixed or proportional systems.
Beyond the incentives posed by the voting system, we identify the level of competition on the centre-periphery dimension as a crucial variable. The presence of other regionalist parties in the same region is likely to trigger a dynamic of radicalization for which, albeit maintaining some differences amongst themselves, all or most regionalist parties escalate their claims (Van Houten, 2000; Massetti, 2009) . The same dynamic can be initiated by a convergence strategy adopted by statewide parties, where the latter try to absorb the regionalist discourse and agenda (Meguid, 2008) . However, adopting a regionalist discourse or agenda might not be enough for statewide parties to acquire partisan credibility in the eyes of regionalist voters (Alonso, 2012) . They might need to go as far as to actually pass regional reforms with concessions for more self-government, in which case we fall back to our primary independent variable (decentralization).
We also consider whether a given regionalist party finds itself in office or in opposition (both at national and regional level). Here the expectation is that holding office might induce moderation while being in opposition might unleash radicalism. Indeed, in order to become an acceptable government coalition partner, a regionalist party might have to moderate its ideological profile (Elias and Tronconi, 2011a) .
Finally, we want to test a hypothesis which runs against our general expectations in regard to decentralization. Since it has been suggested that an asymmetrical regional structure (or reform) might unleash demands in the regions 'left behind' ('reform laggard' regions), especially if regionalist parties are active in those regions (Hombrado, 2011) , we want to see if, in these particular cases, it is the absence, not the presence, of a decentralization reform that can trigger radicalization. In the next section we detail how we identify and classify regionalist parties according to their ideology.
Regionalist parties dataset
We define regionalist parties according to four criteria. First, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections. Second, they are organizationally present and/or field candidates only in a particular sub-territory (region) of the state. Third, the territorial limitation of their political/electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of 'their' region. Fourth, as stated by De Winter (1998: 204) , regionalist parties' core mission is to achieve/protect/enhance 'some kind of [territorial] self-government' for their homeland. The first criterion excludes regional parties that formally or de facto act as regional branches of a statewide party. The second and third criteria exclude statewide parties that are in favor of decentralization or federalization of the state. The fourth criterion excludes ethnic parties that are not interested in the territorial aspect of selfgovernment (but, rather, in community rights).
In order to identify regionalist parties and to be able to classify them according to their ideology we proceeded in several steps. First, we collected regional vote shares 7 for regional and national elections in 19 West European and OECD-countries 8 to create an initial dataset. In a second step we looked at the territorial concentration of the vote and we made use of secondary sources, party internet sites and party manifestoes and documents to determine whether a party can be considered as regionalist. We also applied a relevance criterion; we include in our dataset each regionalist party which obtained at least one per cent of the vote and/or one seat in one national or regional election.
For a significant number of parties we were not able to identify their ideology. Although these constitute less than ten per cent of the total variation in vote shares for national and 16 per cent for regional elections, it nevertheless led to the exclusion of six countries.
9 Greece and Japan also have regionalist parties, but they do not fulfill the one per cent or one seat criterion. The end result is a core dataset of 78 regionalist parties participating in regional and/or national elections in 11 countries. Table 1 provides a summary of regionalist party participation in national and regional elections and Table A1 in Appendix A lists these parties together with their region and ideology score. In the models below the unit of analysis is the ideology of regionalist party in a particular regional or national election. With respect to national elections we disaggregate to the regional level. We made two categorizations of regionalist parties. The first uses a binary variable which codes whether a party is moderate (autonomist) or radical (secessionist) (Massetti and Schakel; Dandoy, 2010; Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, 1989) . The former may differ extensively in terms of selfgovernment claims (from the mere recognition of their region with very limited powers to demands for strong legislative and fiscal powers) but they all respect the unity of the current state. In contrast, the latter want their region to break away in order to form a new independent state (or to join another one). A major benefit associated with a dichotomous classification is that it is robust. We think that the basic distinction between parties that want some degree of self-government within the state and parties that want the region to break away is understood in the same way in different states and regions. Hence binary coding can probably travel safely across political contexts and minimizes subjective interpretation.
A major drawback of a simple dichotomous variable is that meaningful variety within the classes is ignored. In order to find a convenient compromise between the need to appreciate the diversity among the moderate and radical parties, while at the same time retaining the applicability of the concept across different political and institutional contexts, we made two subclasses within these categories (De Winter, 1998; Massetti, 2009; Dandoy, 2010) . In Table 2 we present this more differentiated classification of regionalist parties. 10 We distinguish between two types of moderate (i.e. autonomist) parties: 'protectionist' and 'federalist'. Protectionist parties typically ask for the institutional recognition of their region and for the transfer of enough competences in order to protect regional languages and cultures. An example is the Friesian National Party (FNP) in the Netherlands. Federalist parties actively seek to enhance a maximum level of regional self-government to include a wide range of competences, including fiscal powers, but without questioning the unity of the state. Typical examples are the VU in the 1970s-1980s, the LN before and after its secessionist period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and CiU until 2012.
Within radical parties we differentiate between ambiguously secessionist (here labeled as 'ambiguous') and openly secessionist (here labeled as 'separationist'). The former deploy discourses or put forward proposals which imply the questioning of state unity but are ambiguous in their stance, as they refrain from using clear catchwords, such as 'independence,' 'partition' or 'secession.' A classic example of 'ambiguous secessionist' is Plaid Cymru (PC) before 2003, when the party openly declared its secessionist objective. For a long time previously it had used ambiguous terms such as 'full national status.' Another good example is the PNV during the 2000s, when the party proposed to turn Spain into a sort of loose confederation between the Basque country and the rest of the Iberian state without openly stating an independence goal. In contrast, 'separationist' parties clearly and unambiguously manifest their will to break away from the state, whether to form a new independent state or to (re-)join another. Good examples of this category are the SNP, the N-VA and the Lega Nord in the period 1996-1999.
Variables and method
Our main independent variable concerns decentralization, which we measure using the regional authority index . This measurement distinguishes between self-rule (authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region) and shared rule (authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole). Self-rule and shared rule are operationalized according to eight dimensions. Self-rule is the sum of the following four dimensions:
Institutional depth: the extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated (0-3); Policy scope: the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible (0-4); Fiscal autonomy: the extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population (0-4); Representation: the extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive (0-4).
Shared rule is the sum of the following four dimensions:
Law making: the extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation (0-2); Executive control: the extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings (0-2); Fiscal control: the extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues (0-2); Constitutional reform: the extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change (0-3).
The authors provide yearly scores at the regional level and these are used. The regional authority index is also used to derive a regional reform variable which is operationalized by a cumulative change variable. We track cumulative change in regional authority index scores in national elections once the institutional region is established and for regional elections we start counting from the first regional election onwards. A third decentralization variable is labeled 'reform laggard' which is operationalized as a dummy variable. A region scores positive as reform laggard when there is a decentralization reform, within the same country, for another region but not for the region itself. One set of factors which may impact on regionalist party ideology concerns the socio-cultural, historical, and geographical specificities of the region. To capture regional distinctiveness we introduce three variables. Regions with a distinct history and/or language are measured by a regional language and history index (Fitjar, 2010) .
The language index is made up of the following items, with one point awarded for each item: there is an indigenous regional language that is different from the dominant (plurality) language in the state; the regional language is spoken by at least half the region's population; the language is not the dominant language of any state.
The history index captures the extent to which the region itself or other states than the current sovereign have governed the territory. The index is made up of the following two criteria, with one point awarded for each: the region has not been part of the current state since its formation and the region was not part of the current state for the entire 20th century.
A third variable concerns an island dummy which awards a score of one to island regions.
The electoral system structures party competition to a large extent and we introduce a categorical variable which assigns a score of zero to PR systems, a score of one to majoritarian/plurality systems and half a point to mixed systems. In general, PR systems tend to produce multiparty systems whereas majoritarian/plurality systems lead to two or two-and-a-half party systems. However, there are important exceptions to this and therefore we also include the number of effective parties to tap more directly into the political space available for radical and moderate regionalist parties.
Some authors have stressed the importance of government participation and electoral competition for the radicalism of regionalist party ideologies. We include a dummy variable which indicates whether a regionalist party was in regional or national government at the time when the election took place. In the models below we have to exclude the dummy for being in national government because the number of observations is too low (N ¼ 11), which leads to perfect prediction in the logit models.
Statewide party competition is measured with the use of party manifesto data (Volkens et al, 2010) . We take the percentage of quasi-sentences devoted to decentralization in all party manifestoes for national elections, weigh them by party size and sum them to get an overall score reflecting salience with regard to the decentralization issue. We include a regionalist party competition variable which is operationalized by subtracting the vote share for a particular regionalist party from the total regionalist party vote share in the election.
We include regionalist party size -operationalized as the percentage of vote -as a control variable. Both the ideology of regionalist parties and the scores on some of the independent variables may actually be a result of party size rather than anything else. For example, large regionalist parties may have a larger probability of being included in government as well as being moderate. Table B1 in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics on the independent variables.
We tap the ideology of regionalist parties with two variables, a (robust) dichotomous variable and an ordinal variable with four categories. The binary variable is analyzed with the help of a logit model whereby we use party clustered standard errors. The ordinal variable was originally analyzed by ordered logit models but it appeared that the parallel regression assumption did not hold which entails that the independent variables have different effects on the different types of parties. We therefore opted for multinomial logit models with party clustered standard errors which do not assume a rank order between the categories. According to Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests these models appeared not to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. That is, the preference of a regionalist party for a federalist or secessionist stance is not affected by the possibility of choosing for a protectionist stance.
Below we present changes in predicted probabilities for a particular ideological position or type of regionalist party. These changes in probabilities are obtained by using the prvalue and prgen command available in the SPost package for Stata developed by Scott Long and Freese (2006) . Confidence intervals for the changes in probabilities are obtained by a bootstrap percentile method with 1000 replications. The bootstrap method is more robust to 'noisy' data than, for example, the delta method, and does not require an assumption of normality because bootstrapping re-samples from the dataset and treats the sample as the population. The bootstrap method is often not used because although it 'frequently provides better estimates of the confidence interval bounds, it is computationally intensive' (Scott Long and Freese, 2006: 127) . Table 3 presents the results of a logit model where we estimate the probability of a regionalist party being radical (binary variable; 1 ¼ radical; 0 ¼ moderate) when the independent variables go from low to high. 11 The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables). We expect that a change in each of the independent variables should increase the probability of a regionalist party adopting a radical ideology except for the participation in regional government dummy and the party size variable, which should increase the probability of being moderate.
Results
An important difference across electoral arenas may be observed for the regional authority variables. An increase in regional authority leads to a 27 percentage point increase of being radical in the regional electoral arena but has no effect in the national electoral arena. In contrast, regional reform increases the probability of being radical by 37 percentage points in the national electoral arena and by 15 percentage points in the regional electoral arena. In addition, being a reform laggard leads to a 15 percentage point higher probability of finding a radical party participating in regional elections but does not seem to have an effect on national elections. We analyze the effects of the regional authority variables in more detail below, but first we discuss the other factors that may impact on regionalist party ideology.
In contrast to the regional authority variables we do not observe different effects across electoral arenas except for the competition variables. A change from low to high in the regional language index increases the probability of finding a radical party in the national electoral arena by 45 percentage points and in the regional electoral arena by 15 percentage points. If we also consider the history index, the chance that a regionalist party is radical in the regional electoral arena increases by an additional 23 percentage points. The electoral system has a significant impact on the ideology of regionalist parties in both electoral arenas. A majoritarian/ plurality system increases the probability of being radical by 28 percentage points for regional elections and by a sweeping 71 percentage points for national elections. An additional commonality across electoral arenas is that government participation is associated with moderation. When a regionalist party is in regional government at the time of the election the chance of being radical is reduced by 17 percentage points and seven percentage points respectively for national and regional elections. Competition from other regionalist parties has a statistically significant effect on the probability of being radical (þ33 percentage points) in the national electoral arena but not in the regional electoral Shown are the probabilities for being a radical party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).
arena. Conversely, competition from statewide parties leads to a radicalization (þ7 percentage points) of regionalist parties in regional elections but not in national elections.
In Table 4 we present the changes in probabilities for the fourfold categorization of the ideology of regionalist parties (see Table 2 ) after running a multinomial logit model which does not assume a rank order between the type of parties. Similar to the logit models, the categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables). We expect that a change in each of the independent variables should increase the probability of a regionalist party adopting a more radical ideology except for the participation in regional government dummy and party size, which should increase the probability of adhering to a more moderate ideology.
A major benefit of analyzing four types of regionalist parties is that we can appreciate the diversity among radical and moderate parties and observe how far independent variables have an effect on different types of parties. On a general level, the results in Table 4 corroborate the results reported in Table  3 in that when the probability of being a moderate party tends to decline the chance of being radical increases. However, the effect of the independent variables varies across the type of parties. For example, a change in the regional language index has a similar effect across party type but being part of the regional government at the time of the election decreases only the probability of being openly secessionist. We do not have the space here to go into detail regarding to the differences across types of parties for all the independent variables. It is interesting to note that the regional authority variables gain statistical significance for both national and regional elections in contrast to the results reported in Table 3 . Given that we expect to observe differences with regard to the effects of the regional authority variables across electoral arenas, we explore these effects in more detail.
Starting with the reform laggard variable we may observe that the change in probability for protectionist parties in national and regional elections declines and that the change in probability for being openly secessionist in regional elections increases. Clearly, asymmetric decentralization reforms lead to a radicalization of regionalist parties. The regional authority and regional reform variables are continuous variables and we explore the effects of these variables by analyzing probabilities of being a particular type of regionalist party when these variables go from their minimum to their maximum value. The results are presented in Figures 1 and 2 .
In Figure 1 we explore the effect of regional authority on the ideology of regionalist parties participating in national ( Figure 1A ) and regional ( Figure 1B ) elections when the Notes: * p < 0.05; P ¼ protectionist; F ¼ federalist; A ¼ ambiguous; S ¼ separatist (see Table 1 for a description of the types of parties).
The table displays the results of a multinominal logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is protectionist, federalist, ambiguous secessionist, or openly separatist. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the change for continuous variables reflect going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).
regional authority index goes from its minimum to its maximum. With respect to national elections we observe that the probability of being moderate or radical does not change (respectively 80 and 20 percentage points) but that within the moderate and radical categories the balance between protectionists and federalists, and between ambiguous and openly secessionists, changes. However, only the change in probabilities for being protectionist and federalist reaches statistical significance at the five per cent level. In contrast to national elections, all changes in probabilities are statistically significant for regional elections. When the regional authority index increases from its minimum to its maximum, regionalist parties in the regional electoral arena tend to become more radical and, in particular, ambiguously secessionist (þ7 percentage points), and openly secessionist (þ34 percentage points). Within the moderate category the probability of being protectionist decreases by 83 percentage points whereas the chance of adopting a federalist positionincreases by 42 percentage points.
Interestingly, we observe a reversed pattern for the regional reform variable. In regional elections the balance between the probability of being moderate (90 percentage points) and radical (10 percentage points) does not change but within the moderate category the probability of being federalist increases by 58 percentage points while the chance of being protectionist declines by 66 percentage points (both results are statistically significant at the five per cent level). For national elections we observe a clear radicalization of the ideology of regionalist parties. In particular, the probability of being federalist declines by 60 percentage points whereas the chance of adopting an open secessionist stance increases by 39 percentage points (both results are statistically significant at the five per cent level).
Discussion
In this paper we set out to explain the determinants of regionalist party ideological radicalism on self- 
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Regional Authority Index score Probability protectionist federalist ambiguous separatist Figure 1 . The effect of regional authority on the probability of a type of regionalist party. Notes: Shown are the predicted probabilities for the different types of regionalist parties (see Table 2 ) when the scores on the regional authority index go from their minimum to their maximum (see Table A2 ). The effect of regional reform on the probability of a type of regionalist party. Notes: Shown are the predicted probabilities for the different types of regionalist parties (see Table 2 ) when cumulative change in regional authority index scores go from their minimum to their maximum (see Table A2 ).
government, with a particular interest on the effects of decentralization level and decentralization reform. Starting with the latter, we found strong support for our main hypothesis that decentralization reforms entail a radicalization process for regionalist parties, especially at the national level. We found significant correlations in the expected direction between decentralization reforms and radicalism using both a dichotomous (moderate; radical) and a fourfold classification (protectionist; federalist; ambiguous; separationist). Our models show that, at national level, positive cumulative change on the regional authority index dramatically increases the chances of finding a radical party and, more specifically, a separationist party. The radicalization effect at regional level is much more modest and mainly concerns a shift within moderate positions: a sharp decrease in the chances of finding protectionist parties paralleled with a sharp increase in probability of finding a federalist party. These results are in line with Meguid's argument that decentralization reforms, as a statewide party strategy, are primarily a national level strategy (Meguid, 2013a) ; and with Massetti and Schakel's argument that ideological radicalism, as a counter-remedy of regionalist parties, has a 'damage reduction' effect only in national elections (Massetti and Schakel, 2013) . Bringing together the three works allows us to trace a complex process of strategies and counter-strategies for which:
statewide parties try and undermine regionalist parties' electoral strength at national level by implementing decentralization reforms (Meguid, 2013a) ; this strategy is, indeed, effective in damaging regionalist parties at national level, but it works more with moderate than with radical ones, providing an incentive for radicalization (Massetti and Schakel, 2013) ; and now we found evidence that such an incentive is very strong and the radicalization process does, indeed, occur.
The level of decentralization, which varies across regions but might be constant within the same region over time, has a very different effect compared with that of decentralization reform. At the national level, it does not have a significant impact on determining the chances of finding a radical party. However, it has a strong effect on whether a regionalist party will adopt, within the moderate positions, a protectionist or a federalist stance. As hypothesized, it does not make any sense to make minimal self-government demands in already strongly decentralized contexts. In contrast, trying to push the boundaries of self-government without questioning the unity of the state can represent a meaningful strategy also in strongly decentralized systems. This effect is also evident at regional level. However, in regional party systems, regional reform also affects the probability of finding radical and, especially, separationist parties. This rather unexpected finding might be due to the emergence of small regionalist parties that adopt an outbidding strategy at regional level but do not participate at national level, as well as the consequence of (counter-)strategies triggered at national level.
The results presented in this paper are in line with Brancati's proposition that decentralization reforms indirectly fuel secessionism (Brancati, 2006) , albeit not necessarily because they strengthen regionalist parties electorally -as claimed by Brancati (2008) . Rather, they trigger a counter-strategy on the part of regionalist parties aimed at limiting electoral damage. We therefore conclude that decentralization reforms, far from appeasing regionalist parties, lead them to actually radicalize their claims and adopt a secessionist stance. However, regional reforms may appease some regionalist voters and thus inflict electoral losses on regionalist parties at national level. The resulting level of polarization will depend on the relationship between an increased 'threatening intention' (ideological radicalization) and a decreased 'threatening capacity' (electoral strength). The question whether decentralization 'accommodates' or 'empowers' regionalist pressure does not have a final or simple answer. Furthermore, apart from electoral strength and ideological radicalism we also found differential effects across electoral arenas.
Our analysis has further shown that other institutional/ political factors beyond decentralization play an important role. In particular, we found that: majoritarian electoral systems dramatically increase the probability of finding radical parties, thus confirming Newman (1997) ; as suggested by Van Houten (2000) and Massetti (2009) , competition from other regionalist parties within the region increases the probability of radicalization, but only at national level; whereas holding office increases the probability of moderation, confirming Elias and Tronconi (2011a) .
As far as regional identity is concerned, we found that: the presence of a distinct language significantly affects the probability of finding radical parties in the region at both national and regional level, thus confirming Massetti (2009) ; the effect of the institutional history of the region is more ambiguous, as its impact is only significant in the regional (not the national) electoral arena; and being an island region does not have any impact (actually some coefficients, though insignificant, are negative).
Arguably, although for a few cases our data go back to the 1940s, the empirical analysis shows that the technological progress in transport and telecommunication, which has intensified in the last few decades, has made island regions as integrated as land regions within the state.
Label, definition and internal classification
We label these parties as 'regionalist' following previous authoritative studies ( De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Jolly, 2007; Deschouwer, 2009) . Since the scholarship is characterized by extensive terminological profusion and lack of consensus, 12 it is very important to clearly define the underline concept and, when relevant for the interpretations of results, discuss definitional differences. Following De Winter, we define regionalist parties on the basis of their ideology, as those parties whose primary concern is the achievement of some kind of territorial self-government (De Winter, 1998: 204-205) . As pointed out by other scholars, although the definition is based on ideology, it also entails a territorial characterization: regionalist parties are only present, as organizations and/or in terms of electoral activity, in a specific territory of the state (Türsan, 1998: 5; Gomez-Reino, 2008) . In other words, 'regionalist' parties are also 'regional' ('non statewide') or, more precisely, they are a subset of regional parties. 13 In common with most regional parties they also have an ambition to administer regional powers and resources in the exclusive interest the region (Gomez-Reino et al, 2006: 258) .
Our dataset contains two innovative elements. First, we code regionalist parties' level of ideological radicalism in respect to their self-government claim, distinguishing between moderate (autonomist) and radical (secessionist) ones. Then we made a sub-classification, distinguishing between protectionists and federalists (amongst moderates), and between ambiguous and separationists (amongst radicals). We choose this classification precisely because it refers exclusively to the level of institutional self-government demanded by the party without tapping into identity questions.
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How we gathered the data
In order to identify regionalist parties and to be able to classify them according to their ideology we proceeded in several steps. First, we collected regional vote shares for regional and national elections in 19 West European and OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Second, we consulted the literature and looked at party labels and the territorial concentration of the vote to create an initial dataset. In case of electoral coalitions whereby the regionalist party is a junior party we used the seat allocation within the coalition to assign vote shares to the different coalition partners. When regionalist parties coalesce for elections and we could not use the seat allocation as a mechanism to allocate vote share (for example in the case when the electoral coalition obtains one seat) we allocated the total vote share to the senior party.
Third, we applied a relevance criterion; we include in our dataset each regionalist party which obtained at least one per cent of the vote and/or one seat in one national or regional election. This led to a dataset of 234 regionalist parties in 17 countries. Greece and Japan have also regionalist parties, but they do not reach the one per cent or one seat criterion.
For a significant number of parties we were not able to identify their ideology. Although they constitute less than ten per cent of the total variation in vote shares for national and 16 per cent for regional elections, it nevertheless has led to the exclusion of six countries (Australia, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and the United States). In addition, it has led to the exclusion of 12 ethnic parties (see below). In the next and final step we excluded controversial cases and we do not consider regionalist party competition beyond the core region (see below). The end result is a core dataset of 78 regionalist parties participating in regional and/or national elections in 11 countries. Table A1 lists these parties, their ideology and their core region.
Ethnic parties
Some parties do not demand decentralization for a particular region but rather claim specific (ethnic) group rights, for example, the right to communicate in one's native language which is not recognized as an official state language. We prefer to label these parties as 'ethnic' and we do not consider them to be regionalist. For completeness sake we list the parties we have identified as ethnic. For Austria, they are the Karnter Wahlgemeinschaft (KWG) and the Karntner Einheitsliste (KEL) (Kärnten); for Denmark the Slesvigske partiSchleswigsche Partei (SP; Sonderjyllands); for Finland the Svenska Folkepartiet (SFP; several Finish mainland regions andÅland); for Germany the Südschleswigsher Wähler-verband (SSW; Schleswig-Holstein); for Italy, the Unione Slovena (US; Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and the Ladin parties in South Tyrol: Ladins (Ladins), Moviment Politich Ladins (MPL), and Unione Autonomista Ladina (UAL); for New Zealand the Maori Party (MP; country-wide); for Norway, the Saami people's list (SPL; Finnmark); for the United States, the Partido Nacional de la Raza Unida (PNRU; Texas).
Controversial cases
The classification of parties according to their ideology may provoke some discussion and this is probably also the case for some regionalist parties. For three parties it is not clear in how far they act separately from statewide parties. These are the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) in Bavaria, Germany, the Union del Pueblo Navarro (UPN) in Navarre, Spain, and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in Northern Ireland. The inclusion of these parties is highly problematic as it would open the way to the inclusion of 1940s-1950s; 1970s-1980s 1940s-1960s); Federalist (1970s and 1994 Federalist (1970s and -1997 ; Ambiguous (1979 Ambiguous ( -1993 Other controversial cases concern the regionalist parties competing in the ethnically divided regions of Northern Ireland and Navarre. For these parties it is not clear whether their demands are directed to the central state (i.e. an autonomy claim) or serve to compete with alternative border-drawing claims. These parties are for Northern Ireland (UK) the Democratic Unionist Party (DPU), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Sinn Fein (SF), and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). For Navarre (Spain), it applies to Unio´n del Pueblo Navarro (UPN), Convergencia Demo´cratica de Navarra (CDN), and the Basque parties of the coalition Nafarroa Bai. We prefer to exclude controversial cases.
Electoral participation beyond the core region
Some regionalist parties listed in Table A1 compete in more than one institutional region but we do not consider regionalist party competition beyond the core region. As explained above, some of these regionalist parties look for territorial boundary change rather than for more autonomy for the region they compete in. The parties and regions concerned are: for Belgium, the Flemish parties in Brussels (Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, Vlaams Belang, and Volksunie), the Front De´mocratique des Francophones beyond Brussels, and the Rassemblement Wallon beyond the Walloon region; for Italy the Partito Sardo d'Azione and Movimento per le Autonomie beyond Sardinia and Sicily, respectively; for Spain the Basque regionalist parties (Aralar, Eusko Alkartasuna, Euskadiko Ezkerra, Herri Batasuna-Heusakal Herritarrok-Batasuna and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco) participating in Navarra elections and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya beyond Catalonia.
We also do not consider pan-regionalist parties beyond the core region which consists of multiple institutional regions. This concerns the Lega Nord beyond Padania and the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus beyond Eastern Germany (see notes below Table A1 ). The decision to participate in elections beyond the core region may be induced by electoral rules -e.g. only statewide electoral lists are allowed -or by the electoral strategy of the regionalist party -e.g. the regionalist party needs a couple of hundred more votes to obtain a national seat. We think that the self-government ideology of regionalist parties is by and large, if not completely, affected by party competition in the core region.
Validation of ideology scores
The literature on regionalist parties is characterized by extensive terminological profusion and lack of consensus (see above) and few scholars have attempted to develop a classification of regionalist parties which goes beyond an 'inclusion or exclusion' dichotomy (i.e. a party is regionalist or is not). More generally, the most comprehensive collective works on party positioning have not devoted much attention to the centre-periphery dimension -e.g. the Comparative Manifestos Project.
Amongst studies based on expert surveys, we identify two available datasets: the 2006 Chapel Hill surveys ) and the EPAC dataset by Szöcsik and Zuber (2012) . Differently from our dataset, both of them cover a much shorter period: only the 2000s. In the EPAC dataset we find two measurements concerning party positioning. One of them ('Territorial model') appears to be very similar to ours both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, it aims to capture the position of parties regarding a range of possible In contrast, the second measurement in the EPAC dataset ('Territorial Autonomy'), as well as the variable 'DECENTRAL' in the 2006 Chapel Hill survey (then relabeled 'REGIONS' in the 2010 survey), differ both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, they are concerned with party positioning on the idea of autonomy or political decentralization (i.e. how much parties are in favor or against it), without any specification on the amount of autonomy/decentralization. Operationally, the respective questions ask the experts to place parties along a continuum in which no qualitative threshold is indicated, aside the two extremes: 'strongly in favor of/against territorial autonomy' (EPAC); 'strongly favors/opposes political decentralization' (Chapel Hill). We find these two measurements to be particularly suitable for detecting statewide parties' general orientations towards ethno-regionalist demands for self-government, rather than for detecting their preferences in terms of amount of self-government being devolved, let alone for detecting the radicalism of ethno-regionalist claims (which is what we are after). Therefore, we deem them unsuitable for a validation test of our measurement.
Another study which could be, in principle, used to validate our measurement is the classification made by De Winter (1998 : 205-2007 . However, since we drew so much on this work and on the whole volume (De Winter and Türsan, 1998 ) -definitions, conceptualizations, operationalization, and even coding decisions -we think that a very high correlation between the two measurements would not prove much, beyond the mere fact that our classification can be considered a minor reformulation (in terms of categories) and an empirical extension of De Winter's.
For all these reasons, we run a validation test using the 'Territorial Model' measurement of the EPAC dataset (Szöcsik and Zuber, 2012) . We calculate a Pearson correlation between our measurement (centre-periphery radicalism; we take the scores for the 2000s) and the expert answers on the 'Territorial Model' question. The resulting correlation score is very high (Pearson R 0.81, N parties 28, p < 0.01), providing strong support for the validity of our classification.
Appendix B (Tables C1 and C2 ) and Spain (Tables C3 and C4 ). To ease interpretation of the results we have indicated loss of statistical significance in italics, a change in the results which confirms our hypotheses in bold and a change in the results which are counter to our expectations in italics plus bold. When Italy or Spain is excluded from the analysis we lose about 100 to 140 cases which are about a quarter of the total number of observations. The robust analyses do not include more than 350 observations which is a low number for multinomial logit models which contains four categories in the dependent variable and whereby parties do not move much across categories. Not surprisingly, most of the differences in the results reported in Tables C1, C2 , C3 and C4 concern loss of statistical significance. Out of total of 79 differences in results 56 concern loss of statistical significance (yellow), 11 concern results which run counter to our expectations (red) and 12 results are now in line with our expectations (green).
Focusing on the main variables of interest, the regional authority, regional reform and reform laggard variables, we can observe that only two findings run counter to our expectations. Regional reform leads regionalist parties to moderate their autonomy claims in national elections when the analysis excludes Italy (Table C2 ). However, given that the probability approaches complete certainty (i.e. a probability of 1.00) we suspect this result to arise from estimations problems due to a low total number of observations. In addition, the logit model results for national elections remain robust when Italy is excluded (Table C1) . When Spain is excluded from the logit model regional reform changes sign for national elections which indicates that regionalist parties moderate their claims when more authority is decentralized to the region (Table C3) . However, the multinomial logit model results for regional reform reported in Table C4 for national elections are clearly robust. None of the results reported in the tables below concerning regional elections run counter to our expectations. Nevertheless, when Italy or Spain is excluded from the analysis it may lead to a loss of statistical significance for some of the variables.
The other independent variables are also affected when Italy or Spain are excluded. It would take too much space to discuss all different results in depth. We just note that 42 differences concern loss of significance whereas confirming and disconfirming results balance each other (nine instances for both). When we focus on the confirming and disconfirming results in the models which exclude Italy (Tables C1 and C2) we may observe that the results for the Shown are the probabilities for being a radical party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables). Table 1 for a description of the types of parties). The table displays the results of a multinominal logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is protectionist, federalist, ambiguous secessionist, or openly separatist. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the change for continuous variables reflects going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables). Shown are the probabilities for being a radical party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the continuous variables go from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).
statewide party and regionalist party competition variables confirm our expectations but that the results for the island dummy and party size run counter to what one would expect. The results for the electoral system and number of effective parties confirm our expectations when Spain is excluded (Tables C3 and C4 ) but the results for the variables that tap into regional distinctiveness (regional language, regional history and the island dummy) disconfirm our expectations (Table C4 ).
Overall we conclude that the analyses show that the results are robust in particular when it concerns the main variables of interest, namely the regional authority, regional reform and reform laggard variables. for funding provided through a Newton International Fellowship alumnus fund which allowed him to visit the University of Edinburgh in June 2013 where he could work on this article. The usual disclaimers apply. regionalist parties' ideological positioning towards European integration must also be acknowledged (Lynch, 1996; Jolly, 2007; Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008) . 4. As noted in several previous studies, especially since Newman (1997) and De Winter (1998) , regionalist parties can (and usually do) develop ideological stances on virtually all dimensions/areas (e.g. economic policy, immigration, Notes: *p < 0.05; P ¼ protectionist; F ¼ federalist; A ¼ ambiguous; S ¼ separatist (see Table 1 for a description of the types of parties). The table displays the results of a multinominal logit model whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is protectionist, federalist, ambiguous secessionist, or openly separatist. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the independent variables go from low to high. The categorical variables go from their minimum to their maximum and the change for continuous variables reflect going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables) or their mean (continuous variables).
environment, etc.).
Here we do not analyze party ideology in its entirety, but only regarding their core ideological dimension: the relationship between the region and the state. 5. For instance the Parti Quebecois (PQ) has always participated only in regional (provincial) elections, while the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) has participated only in national (federal) elections. 6. Statewide parties also implement decentralization reforms for other partisan interests, such as office-seeking strategies involving some kind of cooperation with regionalist actors or for gaining control of resources in regions which they dominate electorally (Sorens, 2009; Alonso, 2012; Toubeau and Massetti, 2013; Field, 2013) . 7. In case of electoral coalitions where the regionalist party is a junior party we used the seat allocation within the coalition to assign vote shares to the different coalition partners. When regionalist parties coalesce for elections and we could not use the seat allocation as a mechanism to allocate vote share (for example in the case when the electoral coalition obtains one seat) we allocated the total vote share to the senior party. 8. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 9. Australia, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and the United
States. 10. We tested the validity of our coding using an expert survey on party positioning on the vertical state structure conducted by Szocsik and Huber (2012) . We found a strong correlation (Pearson R 0.81, N parties 28, p<0.01), thus confirming the validity of the measurement of our dependent variable. For a more exhaustive discussion about data validation see Appendix A (section 'Validation of ideology scores'). 11. Given the high concentration of regionalist parties within two states, Italy and Spain (see Table A1 in Appendix A), we ran robustness tests, checking how our results change once we exclude one (or the other) of these two countries. The tests show that our results are overall robust, particularly regarding to the main variables of interest -namely the regional authority, regional reform and reform laggard variables. The results and a more exhaustive discussion of the robustness analyses are presented in Appendix C. 12. Many different alternative labels have been used to refer to largely similar sets of parties. Just to mention some examples: 'ethno-regionalist' (e.g. Tronconi, 2006) , 'regional' (e.g. Brancati, 2008) , 'ethno-regional' (e.g. Levi and Hechter, 1985) , 'ethnonationalist' (e.g Connor, 1977) , 'peripheral nationalist' (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979) , 'peripheral' (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983) , 'regional nationalist'(e.g. Van Atta, 2003) , 'minority nationalist' (e.g. Lynch, 1996) , 'stateless nationalist' (e.g. Guibernau, 1999) , 'non state wide' (e.g. Pallares et al, 1997), 'stateless nationalist and regionalist' (e.g. Hepburn, 2009), 'ethnoterritorial' (e.g. Rudolph and Thompson, 1985) , 'autonomist' (e.g. Elias and Tronconi, 2011a, b) , 'secessionist' (e.g. Sorens, 2005) .
13. For instance, while all Belgian parties are 'regional', Deschouwer distinguishes 'regionalist' parties from all the others using the same definition and terminology as those used in this article (Deschouwer, 2009 ). 14. Some authors highlight the distinction between parties insisting on the recognition of the multinational character of the state as opposed to other regionalist parties that do not have nationality claims (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, 1989; Hepburn, 2009 ). However, this classification overlaps with ours (secessionists vs. autonomists) only to some extent, as the claim for recognition of a separate national identity does not necessarily entail a claim for secession.
